By: *Jaclyn Crittenden
Blog Topic: The Economics of Gun Control
How much are you willing to pay in exchange for gun law reformation?
While there are many ways to change gun control laws, I will summarize one of the proposal, that every gun purchaser has gun insurance. The problem with this method is that just like any other kind of insurance, compliance is unenforceable because it can easily be cancelled or may lapse right after the sale.
Additionally, without people having insurance, this will mean that fewer guns will be sold. As a result, this will cause prices and sales taxes to increase for guns, licenses, ammunition, magazines, and other accessories. Potential excessive rates and taxes would eventually make it so only wealthy people could afford guns. Wealthy people are generally law-abiding citizens as they have assets that can be seized and paychecks that can be garnished.
The legal firearm market would be negatively affected by increases in costs because it creates more demand for the illegal black-market, straw purchases, and gun thefts. For example, judgment proof felons convicted of gun-related crimes can illegally buy guns at a lower price, thus gaining access to firearms while avoiding insurance requirements and the related sales tax.
Middle-class, law-abiding, tax-paying citizens end up bearing an average of $100 billion for every gun purchase under this proposed provision; I agree that something must be done, however, not by means that will financially burden the majority of citizens. That is just not the way to do it!
The opinions expressed herein are strictly those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Widener Journal of Law, Economics & Race.
*Jaclyn Crittenden is a staff member on the Widener Journal of Law, Economics & Race. To learn more about Jaclyn, click here to visit her page.
Shapiro RJ, Hassett KA, The Economic Benefits of Reducing Violent Crime: A case Study of 8 American Cities, Center for American Progress, Washington, DC, June 2012
Supra note 2.
Supra note 3.